We see and hear of the destruction that Mother Nature can rain on homes and people shore-side. But little is blogged about what Mother Nature does to people, ships and boats ( for the record, the difference between a boat and a ship, is that a boat fits onto a ship.) where seeking cover is really very limited and in most cases non-existent. As in Hollywood's version of "The Prefect Storm". Of course most of the Perfect Storm is based on third party reports as well as NOAA/NWS and USCG reports. Just maybe the story of the s/v Sean Seamour II compares with the story plot in the Perfect Storm. Listed here is the log entry from the s/v Sean Seamour II Skipper. The crew was rescued by the United States Coast Guard during Sub-Tropical Storm Andrea. If you remember my posting of 12 May 2007 where the USCG was searching for the s/v Flying Colours. See Subtropical Storm Andrea .
Also running afoul of Andrea was the Hapag-Lloyd Paris Express and during the storm she lost some 21 containers as I also posted on 12 May 2007. Though not unusual for container ships to loose containers during a storm, since wave effects especially those associated with signifiant wave heights (SWH) can and do a lot of damage.
This is a copy of the USCG's Press Release of the days rescues; (Thanks Dennis!)
Portsmouth, VA
The Coast Guard rescued nine people today from three sailboats off the coast of North Carolina. A Coast Guard HH-60 Jayhawk helicopter crew based out of Air Station Elizabeth City, N.C., landed at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point with the latest survivors, who were plucked from their sailboat about 120 miles off shore. This was Air Station Elizabeth City's third rescue today. A rescue helicopter crew hoisted three people from the sailboat Seaker at approximately 7:30 a.m. in the vicinity of Diamond Shoals, N.C. The air crew transported the rescued to Air Station Elizabeth City where they were evaluated by medical crews and released.
In addition to the Seaker rescue, three people were rescued from a makeshift life raft about 160 nautical miles east of Cape Hatteras in 34-foot seas. They were aboard the sailboat Lou Pantai when rough seas and heavy winds forced the three sailors to abandon ship. A Coast Guard helicopter crew transported the rescued to Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point. The sailors are suffering from hypothermia.
The story of the s/v Sean Seamour II is about not just how mother nature can spin a storm but its about the survivors and there experience. Fortunately the crew was rescued after a harrowing time at sea. To date the Flying Colours remains lost at sea.
Weather wise the log is a very interesting read and tells a tale of how mother nature can just as easily spring up at sea as she does on land. Remember Sub-Tropical Storm Andrea formed off our southern east coast not in the tropics as these storms normally do, but still had an impact on shore lines, ships and people.
One of the interesting weather phenomenon that is being explored in the case of the s/v Sean Seamour is what we in the maritime community know as the 'rogue wave" or "freak wave". These waves are relatively large and spontaneous ocean surface waves, which are a threat even to large ships.
These waves are more precisely defined as waves that are more than double the significant wave height (SWH), which is itself defined as the average height (trough to crest) of the one-third highest wave valid for a 12 hour period. During the last 20 years more than 200 supertankers or ships over 200 meters (656 feet) long, have sunk beneath these waves. This is somtimes known as "submarining". Rogue waves are thought to have caused many of these incidents. A ladened vessel enters the wave never to been seen again or in some cases is sunk by shear flooding of massive volumes of water or is just broken in half by the shear stress and weight of the wave and its actions.
Most of these waves occur far out at sea. But Andrea was providing us with a very interesting wave actions along the coast. Sea States along Florida, Georgia North and South Carolina were fluxing between a Sea State of 4 to 8. We are currently investigating the possibility that the s/v Sean Seamour II was struck by one of these rogue or freak waves. We are also investigating whether or not the Hapag-Lloyd Paris Express was also in the same general area that the s/v Sean Seamour II was sailing at eventful day and was struck by the same wave.
Anyone with any information please feel free to post here or contact me.
"ENTRY LOG
By Jean Pierre de Lutz
The vessels particulars s/v Sean Seamour II
Last known location n34.04 /w72.24
Cape Cod, May 12th 2007
This is the log of actions and events driven by the only-subsequently named Sub-tropical Storm Andrea, leading to the sinking of s/v Sean Seamour II and the successful rescue of its entire crew on the early morning of May 7th 2007. We departed from Green Cove Springs on the Saint Johns River in the early morning of May 2nd, 2007.
Gibraltar was our prime destination with a planned stopover in the Azores for commissioning and eventually fuel. The vessel, on its second crossing was fully prepared and some of the recent preparations done by Holland Marine and skipper with crew were as follows: Full rig check, navigation lights, new wind sensor, sheet and line check / replacement new autopilot, stuffing box and shaft seal, house battery bank, racor fuel filtering system, bottom paint, new rudder bearing and check, new auxiliary tiller, full engine maintenance, recertification of life raft and check of GPIRB (good to November 2007), update and replacement of all security equipment (PFDs, flares, medical, etc). Although paper charts were available for all planned destinations, with increased dependence on electronic navigational aids, two computers were programmed to handle both the MaxSea navigation software (version 12.5) as well as the Iridium satphone for weather data (MaxSea Chopper and OCENS).
A full electronic systems checkout and burn trial was done during the days prior to departure. For heavy weather and collision contingencies cutter rigged Sean Seamour II was equipped with two drogues (heavy and light), collision mat, auxiliary electric pump, as well as extensive power tools to enable repairs at sea with the 2.4kva inverter. Operational process and use of this equipment was discussed at length with the crew in anticipation. Other physical process contingencies such as lashing, closing seacocks, companionway doors, etc. were equally treated. The 7 day weather GRIBs downloaded almost daily from April 25th onwards showed no inconsistencies, with the two high and two low pressure systems fairly balanced over the western Atlantic.
Only the proximity of the two low pressure systems seemed to warrant surveillance as the May 5th GRIB would indicate with a flow increase from the N,NO from 20 to 35 knots focused towards coastal waters. Already on a northerly course some 200 nautical miles out, I maintained our navigational plan with a N,NE heading until increased winds warranted a more easterly tack planned approximately 300 nautical miles north of Bermuda towards the Azores. Wind force increased about eight hours earlier than expected and later shifted to the NE reaching well into the 60 knots range by early afternoon, then well beyond as the winds shifted. Considering that we were confronted with a sustained weather system that was quite different from the gulf stream squall lines we had weathered previous days, by mid afternoon I decided to take appropriate protective measures.
From our last known position approximately 217 nautical miles east of Cape Hatteras I reversed course, laying my largest drogue off the starboard stern while maintaining a quarter of the storm jib on the inner roller furl. This was designed to balance the boat's natural windage due in large part to its hard dodger and center cockpit structure. By late afternoon the winds were sustained at well over 70 knots and seas were building fast. I estimate seas were well into 25 feet by dusk but after adding approximately 150 feet of drogue line the vessel handled smoothly over the next eight hours advancing with the seas at about 6 knots (SOG).
By late evening the winds were sustained above 74 kts and a crew member recorded a peak of 85.5 kts. Growing and irregular seas were the primary concern as in the very early hours of the morning the boat was increasingly struck by intermittant waves to its port side. Crew had to be positioned against the starboard side as both were tossed violently across the boat. Water began to accumulate seemingly fed through the stern engine-room air cowls. I believe in retrospect the goosenecks were insufficient with the pitch of larger waves as they were breaking onto the stern. At approximately 02.45 hours we were violently knocked all the way down to starboard. It appears that the resulting angle and tension may have caused the drogue line to rupture (clean cut), perhaps as it rubbed against the same engine-room air-intake cowl positioned just below the cleat.
The line was attached to the port side main winch then fed through the cleat where it was covered with anti-chaffing tape and lubricant. Before abandoning ship I noticed the protected part of the line was intact and extended beyond the cleat some five inches. Its position in the cleat rather than retracted from it also supports this theory. After the knockdown I knew there was already structural damage and that we had lost control of the vessel. I pulled the GPIRB (registered to USCG documented Sean Seamour II) but I suspect that the old EPIRB from 1996 (Registered to USCG documented Lou Pantai, but kept as the vessel was sold to an Italian national in 1998) might have been automatically launched first.
I kept this unit as a redundancy latched in its housing on the port side of the hard dodger; it may have been ejected upon the first knockdown as Coast Guard Authorities questioned relatives with this vessel name versus Sean Seamour II. Herein lies a question that needs to be answered, hopefully it will be in light of the USCG report. The GPIRB initially functioned but the strobe stopped and the intensity of the light diminished rapidly to the extent that I do not know if the Coast Guard received that signal. At the time were worried the unit was not emitting and I reinitiated the unit twice.
The unit sent for recertification with the life raft a few weeks prior had been returned from River Services. They had responded to Holland Marine that the unit was good until this coming November, functioned appropriately, and that the battery had an extra five year life expectancy. I will await reception of the Coast Guard report to find out if one or both signals was processed as all POCs were questioned regarding Lou Pantai and not my current vessel Sean Seamour II (both vessels had been / in the case of Sean Seamour II is US Coast Guard documented).
Expecting worse to come I re-lashed and locked all openings and the companionway. At 02:53hours we were struck violently again and began a roll to 180 degrees. As the vessel appeared to stabilize in this position I unlocked the companionway roof to exit an see where the life raft was. It had disappeared from its poop deck cradle which I could directly access as the helm and pedestal had been torn away. When I emerged to the surface against the boat's starboard (in righted port position) it began its second 180 degree roll.
As it emerged the rig was almost longitudinal to the boat barely missing the stern arch. Spreaders were arrayed over cockpit and port side, mast cleanly bent at deck level, forestays apparently torn away. I ordered the crew to start all pumps. By their own volition they also cut out 2.5 gallon water bottles to enable physical bailing while I continued to locate the liferaft. It finally appeared upside down under the rig.
As its sea anchors and canopy lines were entangled in the rig and partially torn by one of the spreaders I decided to cut them away in an effort to save time and effort. I needed the crew below and had to manage the rig entanglement alone. This done I managed to move the unit forward and use its windward position to blow it over the bow to starboard, attaching it still upside down. Below, water was being stabilized above the knees. The new higher positioned house battery bank was not shorted by the water level but the engine bank was flooded not enabling us to start the engine and pump from the bilge instead of the seacock.
In retrospect this was not a loss as having to keep one of the companionway doors off for bailing and to route the Rule pump pipe, the water pouring in from here and the through-deck mast hole were no match for the impeller' volume. Plugging the mast passage was also not a solution as it was moving and hitting violently against the starboard head wall and was dangerous to try to cope with. I knew the situation was desperate but it was still safer to stay aboard than to abandon ship, let alone in the dark any earlier than necessary. Estimating daylight at about 05:30 hours, we needed to hold on for at least another two hours.
As the boat shifted in the waves it became increasingly vulnerable to flooding from breaking waves. One such wave at about 05:20 added about 18 inches of water, as the bow was now barely emerged these two factors triggered my decision to abandon ship. I exited first knowing that the raft was still upside down. In addition, some of the canopy lines still needed to be cut from the rig entanglement. In the precipitation the grab bag containing Iridium phone, VHF, GPS and all our personal and ship documents was lost. As we boarded the now upturned raft it immediately flooded with the breaking waves and once unprotected from the wind by the hull structure was prone to turn over (no sea anchors nor canopy to roll over on).
Hypothermia was already gaining upon one of my crew and myself and our efforts to right and re-enter the raft drained strength. Periods spent lying on the overturned raft exposed to the wind seemed to further weaken us." Sean Seamour II sank a few minutes after we abandoned ship fully disappearing from view after the second wave crest. We became aware of fixed wing overflight sometime between 06:00 and 07:00 hours and estimate that the Coast Guard helicopter arrived some time around 08:30 hours. As seemingly the most affected by hypothermia and almost unconscious the crew had me lifted out first.
It was a perilous process during which Coast Guard AST2 Dazzo was himself injured (later to be hospitalized with us). The liferaft was destroyed and abandoned by AST2 Dazzo as the third crew member was extracted. He also recouped the GPIRB which remained in USCG custody. The emotions and admiration felt by my crew and myself to the dedication of this Coast Guard team is immeasurable, all the more so when hearing them comment on the severity and risk of the extraction, perhaps the worst they had seen in ten years (dixit SAT2 Dazzo).
They claim to have measured 50 plus foot waves which from our perspective were mountains. We measured after the first knockdown and before loosing our rig winds still in excess of 72 knots. Also to be commended are the medical teams involved, from our ambulatory transfer of custody from the rescue team to the personnel awaiting us at Cherry Point Naval Hospital.
There the personnel under Director for Administration CDR Robert S. Fry sought not only to address our physical and medical trauma, but preempted the humanitarian crisis we were facing after all this loss and anguish by bringing in the disaster relief assistance of the American Red Cross to whom we owe the clothes, shelter and food that helped us survive this ordeal."
Additional Research:
Rogue Waves and Explorations of Coastal Wave Characteristics
More to come so standby!
RS
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